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A FREE PRESS AND A FAIR TRIAL
A BAR ASSOCIATION VIEW
By ROBERT L. TRESCHERt
T HE QUESTION under consideration is as simple of statement as
it is difficult of solution - how to reconcile the right of a
criminal accused to the "speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury"
assured by the sixth amendment' with the freedom of speech and of
the press guaranteed by the first.2
Although the tragic events in Dallas in November of 1963 have
appeared to generate the present controversy, these great constitutional
principles embodied in the first and sixth amendments have been set
on their present collision course for many years. Several celebrated
cases have stimulated public discussion of fair trial and free press in
bygone decades. 3  The current debate, however, assumes a sense of
greater urgency in the accommodation of constitutional principles.
If one can discern a trend in more recent pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court, it points in the direction of surrounding
the accused with an expanding range of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Important among these are the right to counsel' and
the other rights afforded by the sixth amendment, including the right
to trial by an "impartial jury." At the same time, technological ad-
vances have enabled television, radio and the press to provide virtually
every citizen with detailed news of public concern, including the com-
mission of crime and the arrest and prosecution of the criminal accused.
t B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, University of Pennsylvania; Chancellor, Philadelphia
Bar Association.
To the extent that any of the views herein are not expressed in resolutions
duly adopted by the Philadelphia Bar Association, they are those of the author and do
not reflect the official policy of the Philadelphia Bar Association. The author believes,
however, that such views meet with the approval of an overwhelming majority of the
members of the Bar Association.
1. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsTr. amend. VI.
2. The first amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
3. See, e.g., Robbins, The Hauptmann Trial in the Light of English Criminal
Procedure, 21 A.B.A.J. 301 (1935) ; Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in
Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. Rlv. 453 (1940).
4. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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In keeping the public thus informed the media perform a socially im-
portant function which is protected by the first amendment.
The constitutional confrontation which we are discussing here
today has been long in the making. The events in Dallas have con-
tributed a vehicle for the current debate. The assassination of President
Kennedy and the events that followed have furnished a not-to-be-
forgotten occasion for the adoption of an unequivocal resolve by the
courts, the bar, the police and press alike, that the treatment accorded
Oswald and Ruby never shall be repeated.
Chapter five of the Warren Report described in detail the cir-
cumstances surrounding the detention and death of Oswald.' The
Report criticized public authorities for releasing to the media the
evidence against Oswald. It also criticized the news media for exerting
immense pressure on the authorities for disclosures. But the Report
makes clear that the responsibility for what transpired and for the
taking of corrective action does not lie with the police and media
alone. Thus chapter five of the Report concludes:
The burden of insuring that appropriate action is taken to estab-
lish ethical standards of conduct for the news media must also
be borne . . . by State and local governments, by the bar, and
ultimately by the public. The experience in Dallas during No-
vember 22-24 is a dramatic affirmation of the need for steps to
bring about a proper balance between the right of the public to
be kept informed and the right of the individual to a fair and
impartial trial.
In the debate which has followed publication of the Report, nu-
merous proposals for dealing with the issue raised by the Warren
Commission have been exhaustively explored.
Some observers, particularly representatives of the media, have
been of the view that existing judicial machinery is adequate to protect
the rights of the criminal accused. Changes of venue, continuances,
voir dire examinations, sequestration and cautionary instructions are
among the principal methods by which courts have sought to protect
the defendant from prejudicial pretrial publicity.
Changes of venue, however, are rarely granted, and if the trial
involves a particularly noteworthy crime or well-known figure it is
apparent that this remedy may not be effective.
The granting of a continuance also may dilute the effect of pre-
trial publicity, but justice delayed is often justice denied. More im-
portantly, the sixth amendment guarantees the defendant the right to a
5. REPORT 01 THE WARREN COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY, ch. V (Bantam Book ed. 1964).
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"speedy" trial. He should not be forced to abandon this constitutional
right as the condition of securing another right guaranteed by the
sixth amendment - a trial by an impartial jury.
Voir dire examination in most cases serves to assure impar-
tiality. But there is substantial reason to believe that even the most
conscientious juror who has been exposed to prejudicial pretrial
publicity may be unable to exclude such extra judicial statements from
his deliberations, despite his protestations on voir dire to the contrary.
Sequestration effectively prevents contamination of the jury from
extra judicial publicity during trial, but it is powerless to prevent
exposure to pretrial publicity prior to impaneling of the jury. In addi-
tion, sequestration tends to be unpopular with the jurors and invariably
involves great inconvenience and expense.6
Preventative and corrective cautionary instructions by the trial
judge not to read or discuss the case outside the courtroom and not
to be influenced by prior publicity are commonly utilized in an attempt
to insure the jury's continued impartiality. Such instructions, how-
ever, are of doubtful effectiveness in neutralizing the effect of prejudi-
cial publicity. As Mr. Justice Jackson aptly stated: "The naive
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions
to the jury . .. all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fic-
tion."'
7
Those who favor utilization of existing machinery to insure a fair
trial, despite prejudicial pretrial publicity, point out that if the jury
is partial in fact, the rights of the defendant can be protected by the
granting of a new trial. Entirely apart from the significant drain on
judicial resources that multiple trials involve, this remedy is rarely
invoked and only when it is proved that the jurors, despite their
pledge to render an impartial verdict, were in fact prejudiced.8
6. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 388, 204 A.2d 841, 851(1964), where the New Jersey Supreme Court pertinently observed:
even though the improper publicity has not resulted in a new trial, it imposed a
substantial and otherwise unnecessary expense on the taxpayers of the County of
Passaic. As has been indicated above, there was to be no sequestration of thejury until the full complement of 14 had been chosen. But, when the prejudicial
matter appeared in the two local papers on successive days, the trial court felt
obliged to abandon the plan and to order immediate sequestration as jurors were
accepted. Impaneling of the jury took three weeks. Sequestration began on the
second day of trial and after only one juror had been sworn. The cost to the
public of maintaining the jurors during that long period before a single bit of
evidence could be offered in support of the indictment was wholly unnecessary but
for the newspaper articles.
7. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion).
8. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Supreme Court estab-
lished standards for measuring impartiality which have been adhered to ever since.
There it was held that a defendant must affirmatively show the existence of a pre-
conceived opinion of sufficient strength that a presumption of partiality is raised. This
holding was cited with approval in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), in which the
Supreme Court granted a new trial where eight of the jurors confessed to an opinion
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It is, therefore, apparent that these traditional methods of safe-
guarding the fair trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment fall far
short in actual practice of undoing the harm caused by prejudicial
pretrial publicity. Indeed, they are totally impotent in controlling or
preventing the cause of partiality in the jury - improper pretrial
publicity.
Our English friends deal as a matter of course with the problem
in a direct and forthright manner. In England, prejudicial pretrial
publicity is largely curbed by the free use of the power of the courts
to punish for contempt. Thus English and Commonwealth courts have
punished as contempt any statements by the media which are or may
be damaging to a person charged with crime, which review his
criminal record, or which express opinions as to his guilt or innocence.
Indeed, the English rule even makes it contempt for a newspaper to
conduct its own investigation as to a crime for which an arrest has
been made and to publish the results of that investigation.9
Attempts to invoke the English rule in the United States have
met with little success. Since 1941 the Supreme Court has reversed
contempt convictions by state courts in at least four cases.1" In each
of these cases, the freedom of speech and freedom of the press pro-
tected by the first amendment were held to preclude the convictions.
The English rule was said not to be controlling. The fact that an
out of court publication has an "inherent tendency" or "reasonable
tendency" to cause disrespect for the judiciary or to interfere with the
orderly administration of justice in a pending case was held not to be
sufficient to punish for contempt under applicable Supreme Court
cases.11 Such publications are not the basis for a contempt conviction
of guilt before trial, the accused's trial had become the cause celebre of the com-
munity and almost 90% of the prospective jurors entertained some opinion of guilt.
In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the defendant was granted a new trial
where three members of the jury had seen the defendant confess the crime over a
televised interview with the sheriff. Although some observers believe that Irvin and
Rideau represent a departure from prior law, they demonstrate the extreme nature
of the showing which is required before a new trial will be granted to expunge the
prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity.
9. See generally Cowen, Prejudicial Publicity and Fair Trial: A Comparative
Examination of American, English and Commonwealth Law, 41 IND. L.J. 69 (1965).
10. Woods v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig-v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367(1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941).
11. Cf., Bridges v. California, supra note 11, at 272-73. The impotency of the
contempt power to protect the criminal accused from prejudicial pretrial publicity is
illustrated by Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950). There, a
Maryland trial court had adjudged a radio station in contempt. After advising listeners
to "Stand by for a Sensation" the station broadcast to a community already outraged
over the recent commission of a similar crime, news of the arrest, confession and
criminal record of a Negro charged with the murder of an eleven year old white girl.
The broadcast also contained a confession by the accused of the commission of a prior
rape of a white woman. Because of the broadcast the defendant felt compelled to
waive a jury trial. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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unless they fall within the "clear and present danger" test applicable
under the first amendment.12
Other observers concerned with curbing publicity prejudicial to
the accused have advocated statutory solutions. Typical of these is
the legislation proposed in Massachusetts1 imposing criminal sanctions
upon the media, the police and court officers for the publication of con-
fessions, criminal records, opinions of guilt and evidence tending to
connect the accused with commission of the crime. The Morse Bill, 4
approved by the Judicial Conference upon the recommendation of
Judge Smith's committee, makes it contempt of court for any employee
of the United States, the defendant or his counsel to disclose informa-
tion "which might affect the outcome of any pending criminal litiga-
tion." Laudable as such legislation appears to be in its purpose of
preventing prejudicial pretrial publicity, it is probable that convictions
cannot survive the first amendment except to the extent that the
publications fall within the "clear and present danger" test. Accord-
ingly, it is doubtful that such legislation would be any more effectual in
curbing pretrial publicity than is the existing contempt power.
Still other commentators have favored the voluntary adoption by
the media, police and bar of codes regulating or governing pretrial
release and publication of information concerning the commission of
crime and the arrest and prosecution of the accused.' 5 To the extent
broadcast was protected by Harney, Pennekamp and Bridges. When the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, Mr. Justice Frankfurter issued his classic opinion, carefully
pointing out that denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court is not equivalent to an
implied affirmance. The text and circumstances of the broadcast are reported at
Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
12. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and the cases which
followed, the Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech and expression cannot
be constitutionally restrained unless there is a "clear and present danger" that the
substantive evil sought to be prevented will otherwise result. Such cases involved the
constitutionality of convictions under espionage acts. E.g., Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (under a
criminal syndicalism act) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (under an "anti-
insurrection" act) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (for breach of
the peace at common law). In Bridges v. California, supra note 11, the Supreme Court
held that the standards evolved in these earlier cases were applicable even in contempt
cases, which unlike Schenck and its progeny, involve the preservation of the sixth
amendment right to a fair trial as well as first amendment issues. As a result the
contempt power cannot be utilized to deter prejudicial pretrial publicity unless there is
a "clear and present danger" that such publicity will, in fact, interfere with the
administration of justice in a pending case.
13. H.R. Bill 3991, "An Act Protecting a Trial by Jury from Influence by the
Divulgence, Broadcast or Publication of Certain Information" (introduced by State
Representative Sigourney, 1965).
14. S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced by Senator Wayne Morse on
January 6, 1965).
15. OREGON BAR-PRXsS-BROADCASTFRS JOINT STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLS (1962)
MASSACHUSETTs GuIDE FOR THE BAR AND NEws MEDIA (1963). The text of
these and other codes are reproduced in Hearings on S. 290 Before the Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965
(hereinafter cited as Hearings).
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that such voluntary codes curb pretrial publicity prejudicial to the
accused they are commendable. But such codes contain no machinery
for enforcement. Indeed, less responsible representatives of the news
media may choose not to adhere to such codes. Our experience in
Philadelphia is instructive in this regard. A joint committee comprised
of members of the Philadelphia Bar Association and representatives
of the media other than the newspapers (which declined to participate)
recently adopted recommendations concerning fair trial and free press
in a voluntary effort to safeguard the socially necessary function of
free press to inform the public and the right of individuals to a fair
trial. Among other recommendations, the joint committee suggested
that in the absence of overriding considerations of public policy, "the
news media [should] not publish the prior criminal history of the
accused, purported admissions or confessions made by the accused in
the absence of his counsel or expressions of the guilt or innocence of
the accused." The recommendations of the joint committee were
adopted at a special meeting of the Philadelphia Bar Association on
November 9, 1965. Although the character of the information which
has since been published has been generally less prejudicial, we be-
lieve that there is still room for substantial improvement, and Phila-
delphia's leading newspapers continued, and still continue, to publish
confessions, admissions and prior criminal records despite the recom-
mendations of the joint committee to the contrary.
Self-restraint and legislative solutions to the fair trial-free press
controversy deserve careful consideration. However, the bar asso-
ciations, if the Philadelphia Bar Association is typical, believe that
the first responsibility of members of the bar lies in putting their own
house in order. Although an effective code self-imposed by the news
media is largely illusory, the legal profession possesses the machinery
to insure compliance with its own standards of professional conduct
which are codified in our Canons of Professional Ethics. If an at-
torney practices in a state with an integrated bar, he will be automati-
cally subject to the disciplinary action of the bar association, which
exercises quasi-judicial disciplinary power over its members in the
event they fail to comply with the Canons. If he practices in a state
in which association membership is noncompulsory, as is the case
in Pennsylvania, the bar associations are authorized to commence
disciplinary proceedings for violations of the Canons.
We believe that the principal responsibility for the protection of
the rights of the criminal accused rests upon the members of the bar.
The temptation to cast stones against the press and news media is
strong. But news is properly the business of the newspapers. It is not
[VOL. 11: :p. 677
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incumbent upon us as members of the bar to lecture the press as to
how it should fulfill its own responsibilities. We are, however, dedi-
cated to the proposition that every defendant in every criminal prosecu-
tion shall be accorded his constitutional right to a trial by the "impartial
jury" guaranteed him by the sixth amendment. As members of the
bar, we are convinced that criminal defendants have been, and continue
to be, deprived of that right in all too many cases by reason of improper
pretrial publicity.
The Philadelphia Bar Association was among the first to recog-
nize the profession's heavy burden of responsibility for the shocking
deprivation of the constitutional right of the accused assassin of Presi-
dent Kennedy. On December 4, 1963, less than two weeks after the
assassination, the then incoming Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar
Association told us at our annual meeting held on December 4, 1963:
Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested and charged with the crime. The
television, radio and press immediately spread forth a universal
conviction of his guilt beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt,
thereby making it humanly impossible for the American system
of justice to function with respect to his crime. Where could a
juror be found who had not been exposed to television and the
press? The chances of Oswald's trial by an impartial jury and
his conviction on the basis of evidence purported were wholly
and unmistakeably destroyed.
* * * * * *
In these days of instantaneous communication, the rights of the
accused need protection more than ever. The prosecutor and the
law enforcement officers must assure that no violation of these
rights occurs. There was, it is true, some concern that Oswald
be provided counsel. But no one at that time - not the district
attorney, no judge, no lawyer, no bar association - protested the
publication of the evidence, the twenty-four hour interrogations,
the violation of the prisoner's rights. It is against the legal pro-
fession - not the TV or the press - that the heavy indictment
must lie. It is to be hoped that the Presidential Commission will
not confine its attention to responsibility for the crime but will
also study the failure of the processes of the law.
Early in 1964, the Philadelphia Bar Association's Committee on
Criminal Law undertook to make a study of the relationship between
fair trial and free press and to draft guide lines that would minimize
the danger of serious conflict between the two. The Committee's
proposals were set forth in a statement of policy which was approved
SUMMER 1966]
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at a special meeting of the Association on December 29, 1964.16 The
proposals barred three specific activities on the part. of the members
of our bar, the prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel alike: first
they forbade the release of any statement that an accused had made a
confession; secondly, they prohibited disclosure to the media of the
past record of the accused; and thirdly, they ruled out release by a
lawyer to the media of evidence indicating the lawyer's belief in the
guilt or innocence of anyone charged with the crime. In addition, the
statement suggested that the police and the news media should refrain
from releasing or publicizing any evidence falling within the foregoing
categories. We were careful to point out, however, that any restraints
with respect to the news media must be self-imposed.
Thereafter, the Bar Association appointed a Special Committee
on Fair Trial and Free Press to consider methods of implementing
the Bar Association guide lines. The Committee concluded that the
Bar Association should take steps to compel compliance with the
highest degree of professional responsibility of all members of the
bar engaged in the administration of justice in the trial of criminal
cases. Accordingly, the Committee recommended the amendment of
the Canons in such a way as to proscribe the issuance of statements by
counsel for either side which would disclose prejudicial information
about any case before or during trial. It was concluded that Canon 5,
which relates to the responsibilities of counsel engaged in the prosecu-
tion or defense of criminal cases, 1 and Canon 20, which relates to
newspaper discussion of pending litigation,'" be amended to insure a
fair trial to persons accused of crime.
At a special meeting of the Philadelphia Bar Association on No-
vember 9, 1965, the report of the Committee was adopted and it was
16. See Statement of Policy of Philadelphia Bar Association Regarding Release
and Publication of Information in connection with Criminal Proceedings, reproduced
at Hearings, pp. 108-11.
17. Canon V in its present form provides:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person accused of
crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise
innocent persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances might be denied proper
defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and
honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the land permits, to
the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict,
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the secreting of wit-
nesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible.
18. Canon XX now reads:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may
interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due adminis-
tration of justice. Generally, they are to be condemned. If the extreme circum-
stances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional
to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond
quotation from the records and papers on file in the court; but even in extreme
cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1966], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss4/6
A FREE PRESS AND A FAIR TRIAL
resolved that Canons 5 and 20 be amended by the addition of the
following paragraphs:
Amendment to Canon 5
It is the duty of a lawyer engaged either in the prosecution
or the defense of a person accused of a crime to refrain from any
action which might interfere with the right of either the accused
or the prosecuting governmental entity to a fair trial. To that
end it is improper and professionally reprehensible for a lawyer
so engaged to express to the public or in any manner extra-
judicially any opinion or prediction as to guilt or innocence of
the accused, the weight of the evidence against him or the likeli-
hood that he will be either convicted or acquitted.' 9
Amendment to Canon 20
Lawyers, both for the prosecution and defense, must com-
pletely refrain from making any statement or giving any release
with respect to pending criminal cases from the time of the arrest
until the final determination; except as to identity of defendant,
nature of charge, and time, place and circumstances of arrest.
Disclosures should include only incontrovertible factual mat-
ters, and should not include subjective observations. In addition,
where background information or information relating to the
circumstances of an arrest would be highly prejudicial and where
the release thereof would serve no law enforcement function, such
information should not be made public.2"
At the present time the Professional Ethics Committee of the
American Bar Association has under consideration these proposed
amendments to the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In the event that the Canons are appropriately amended, we be-
lieve that the source of much prejudicial pretrial publicity will be
curbed. Vigorous enforcement of the Canons by the bar associations
will, of course, be required in the event that the amendments are to
have the desired effect.2
19. The standing committee of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Associa-
tion previously had recommended the amendment to Canon V set forth in the text.
As a result, the Philadelphia Bar Association's resolution authorized its joinder in
the amendment to Canon V which had been previously proposed.
20. The proposed amendment to Canon XX is believed to have originated with
the Philadelphia Bar Association. Accordingly, the resolution authorized the Bar
Association to recommend adoption of amendment to the Professional Ethics Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association.
21. Compare New Jersey v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852
(1964), where it was stated:
In our view Canons 5 and 20 of the Canons of Professional Ethics require a
broader and more stringent rule. We interpret these canons, particularly Canon
20, to ban statements to news media by prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and their
lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpatory admissions by the
accused, or to the effect that the case is 'open and shut' against the defendant,
SUMMER 1966]
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To the extent that the police are not subject to the control of the
prosecuting authorities, and often they are not, vigorous enforcement
of the recommended amendments may not be effective to prevent all
disclosures of the type likely to result in prejudicial pretrial publicity.
In such cases we favor adoption by law enforcement agencies of state-
ments of policy similar to the one promulgated by Attorney General
Katzenbach.22 This statement of policy precludes public disclosure by
Department of Justice personnel of certain types of information tending
to create dangers of prejudice without serving significant law enforce-
ment functions. Under this policy, Justice Department personnel are
precluded from releasing information such as statements, admissions,
confessions or alibis attributable to a defendant, references to investi-
gative procedures, statements concerning the identity, credibility or
testimony of prospective witnesses and statements concerning evidence
or arguments in the case.
The Philadelphia Bar Association believes that the rights of the
criminal accused to a fair trial can best be preserved by nondisclosure
of prejudicial information by the prosecution, the defense and law
enforcement agencies. Nondisclosure generally will prevent exposure
of potential jurors to prejudicial pretrial publicity. At the same time
the freedom of the press is preserved. Indeed, such a program imposes
no restraint whatever upon the news media.
Some have said that nondisclosure to the media impairs the
public's so-called "right to know." The public, however, does not
possess any such "right to know" or to obtain information as to matters
which interfere with the right of a criminal accused to a fair trial.
Each of the guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights are individual
rights designed and intended to protect individuals from an over-
reaching sovereign. Among these rights are the freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. But these are individual, not collective, rights.
They protect an individual from prosecution for his utterances. They
do not license gratification of public curiosity at the expense of an
individual's right to a fair trial. They do not substitute trial by press
or public opinion, for trial by the impartial jury guaranteed by the
sixth amendment.
and the like, or with reference to the defendant's prior criminal record, either of
convictions or arrests. Such statements have the capacity to interfere with a fair
trial and cannot be countenanced. With respect to prosecutors' detectives and
members of local police departments who are not members of the bar, statements
of the type described are an improper interference with the due administration of
criminal justice and constitute conduct unbecoming a police officer. As such they
warrant discipline at the hands of the proper authorities.
22. "Statement of Policy Concerning the Release of Information by Personnel of
the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Proceedings", 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1965),
reproduced at Hearings, pp. 39-40.
[VOL. 11 : p. 677
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Others may say that such nondisclosure muzzles the press by
depriving the media of its sources of information. We recognize that
the press will be unable to publish that to which it does not have
access. But we, as members of the bar whose responsibilities extend
to the press, the members of the public and the criminal accused alike,
do not believe that the inability of the media to publish before trial
the admissions, confessions and criminal record of the accused in any
way impairs the historic and constitutional function of the "free press".
The concept of a "free press" in our society is a basic one of long
standing. Ever since the early days of Peter Zenger the right of the
press to comment and speak out upon matters of public moment,
including the operations of government, has been well recognized. A
"free press" exposes to public scrutiny all of the relevant affairs of
government including the misconduct or misfeasance of public officials.
An electorate so informed is able to discriminate intelligently in the
voting booths between corrupt or inefficient officials and dedicated and
worthy civil servants. In this manner the integrity of our governmental
institutions and the democratic process is maintained at a high level.
The freedom of the media to speak out with respect to the
judicial functions of government is equally important. The reluctant
prosecutor or the incompetent judge, just as the corrupt legislator or
the inefficient administrator, should be made to withstand the test
of public scrutiny. In this way the public is assured that its judicial
institutions function in accordance with the highest of standards.
Thus, the concept of a "free press" requires that the news media
have freedom to speak out with respect to the operation of our govern-
mental institutions, including the judiciary, so that an informed public
will promote the integrity of government.
It is not, however, the function of the press or the public to deter-
mine the guilt or innocence of the criminal accused. This responsibility
is entrusted to our judicial institutions to be exercised in strict accord-
ance with well defined constitutional principles. If, however, the prose-
cutor or the judge fails to fulfill the responsibilities of his office, he is
accountable to the public, just as any other governmental official. And
a public so enlightened after trial by a "free press" justly can complain
of an apparent miscarriage of justice or a misfeasance in office and take
whatever steps as are available to prevent their repetition. Nothing
contained in the Philadelphia Bar Association proposals in any way
interferes with this historic and important function of the press.
It would appear, therefore, that the vitality and function of a
"free press" is not eroded by curtailing pretrial publicity of a kind
likely to impair the "fair trial" in the manner proposed by the Phila-
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delphia Bar Association. So viewed, the apparent collision between a
"free press" and a "fair trial" is avoided. The case of free press
versus fair trial is not then a real controversy, and so characterizing
the issue serves only to promote a dispute between the members of
two honorable and distinguished professions. The Philadelphia Bar
Association has thus sought to place the issues in what we believe to
be their true perspective.
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